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Abstract: Foucault’s theory of power and subjectification challenges common concepts of freedom 
in social philosophy and expands them through the concept of ‘freedom as critique’: Freedom can 
be defined as the capability to critically reflect one’s own subjectification, and the conditions of 
possibility for this critical capacity lie in political and social institutions. The article develops this 
concept through a critical discussion of the standard response by Foucault interpreters to the stand-
ard objection that Foucault’s thinking obscures freedom. The standard response interprets Fou-
cault’s later works, especially The Subject and Power, as a solution to the problem of freedom. It 
is mistaken, because it conflates different concepts of freedom that are present in Foucault’s work. 
By differentiating these concepts, this paper proposes a new institutionalist approach to solve the 
problem of freedom that breaks with the partly anarchist underpinnings of Foucault scholarship: 
As freedom as critique is not given, but itself a result of subjectification, it entails a demand for 
‘modal robustness’ and must therefore be institutionalized. This approach helps to draw out the 
consequences of Foucault's thinking on freedom for postfoundationalist democratic theory and the 
general social-philosophical discussion on freedom. 
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Michel Foucault is known as a philosopher who renewed our thinking of power. His theory of 
power also makes it possible to develop a new, complex understanding of freedom – by problem-
atizing our social-philosophical thinking about freedom. According to Foucault’s concept of sub-
jectification, power permeates subjects more profoundly than it is usually described in social phi-
losophy, because power constitutes subjects in the first place. This new thinking of power is also 
a critique of the common concepts of freedom in social philosophy that either understand freedom 
as independence from power or do not address the social constitution of subjectivity as a problem 
of power. 
The three common concepts of freedom are negative, reflective, and social freedom.1 The 
negative concept of freedom defines freedom as the absence of external interference or domina-
tion. But Foucault shows that heteronomy works inside the subject, and therefore there can be no 
free inner core of the subject, as is presupposed in negative concepts of freedom. The reflective 
concept of freedom defines freedom as reason. Yet, according to Foucault, there is no universal 
reason independent of power, but thinking is always located historically and socially – at the heart 
of reason beats heteronomy. Finally, the social concept of freedom defines freedom through inte-
gration into a good society. But with Foucault, the dark side of integration becomes visible: a 
paternalistic normalization that leads to conformity. However, Foucault does not propose an alter-
native notion of freedom which would be compatible with and following from his theory of sub-
jectification. In this article, I develop such a new concept of freedom: freedom as the capability to 
criticize one's own subjectification, which is dependent on subjectifying institutions – in short: 
freedom as critique. 
Freedom as critique expands the current debates on freedom, by serving as a candidate 
alongside the concepts of negative, reflexive and social freedom which on the one hand includes 
plausible insights of these three approaches and corrects their blind spots on the other hand. With 
social freedom it shares the view that subjects are socially constituted, that is that their abilities 
depend on their socialization through recognition processes and that there is no pre-social core of 
the subject as assumed by negative freedom and no universal reason as assumed by reflexive free-
dom. With reflexive freedom it shares the belief that ultimately only constant critical reflection 
helps in the process of working on freedom and that therefore the institutionalization of reflection 
processes is central. With negative freedom, freedom as critique shares the concern regarding the 
paternalizing effects of a normalization in the name of a theoretically or politically determined 
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good which can arise from a universalist conception of reason of reflexive freedom and the focus 
on the social integration of social freedom.2 If one summarizes the three concepts of freedom in a 
step-by-step model of development and sublimation, freedom as critique can be understood as a 
fourth step, i.e. as a reaction to the pessimistic, dark side of social freedom.3 It emphasizes the 
costs and sufferings of what can be optimistically called socialization, and in this pessimism calls 
it subjectification. In contrast to all three concepts of freedom, freedom as critique makes it possi-
ble to conceive the ‘inner’ unfreedom of subjects as a political problem and thus to debunk the 
liberal “myth of the given”4 without falling into illiberal, total politicization. Freedom as critique 
is thereby particularly suited as a normative clarification of postfoundational concepts of democ-
racy. 
The path to this new understanding of freedom is not a hermeneutic re-reading of Foucault's 
works but the critique of a particular branch of their reception: the second phase of social-philo-
sophical debate about freedom in his works. In the first phase of this debate, the problem of free-
dom was articulated: Social philosophers regarded Foucault as one of their own and criticized him, 
consequentially, for being a poor social philosopher, in particular for describing subjects as so 
profoundly determined by power that freedom and resistance were no longer conceivable. The 
most prominent authors who criticized Foucault in this way were Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, 
Nancy Fraser, and Charles Taylor, among others.5 The second phase, which culminated in the 
2000s and continues to this day, consists of attempts to defend Foucault against the accusations 
raised and to solve the problem of freedom by explicating the notion of freedom Foucault puts 
forward.  
While, in the existing literature, there are several systematically different approaches in 
defending Foucault,6 which I reconstruct and criticize in Freiheit als Kritik. Sozialphilosophie 
nach Foucault7, one feature prevalent in most approaches is to interpret Foucault’s later works as 
a solution to the problem of freedom raised in the earlier works. Central to such claims is to refer 
to the later text The Subject and Power (1983). This is one of the few pieces where Foucault writes 
in an explicitly social-philosophical idiom in contrast to his normal method and style, the genea-
logical analysis. Foucault, in this text, states quite clearly that freedom is a presupposition of 
power. The supporters of Foucault take this stance as a solution to the problem of freedom. I call 
this interpretation the “standard response”, as it is common among social philosophical Foucault 
interpreters nowadays.8 My thesis is that it is mistaken, as it does not solve the right problem of 
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freedom – because there are actually two different kinds of problems. I call these the problem of 
power determination and the problem of subjectification. I will argue that the standard response 
only answers to the equally “standard objection”, i.e. the problem of power determination, and not 
the problem of subjectification. This differentiation already lays the grounds for a solution of the 
problem of subjectification: It is necessary to account for the ‘modal robustness’ of freedom as 
critique, i.e. the capability to critically reflect one’s own subjectification. This entails to take the 
subjectivating effects of political institutions into account and thereby interpret Foucault not as an 
anarchist, but as a political theorist. This institutionalist interpretation rather than the standard re-
sponse can give a coherent account of Foucault’s thinking of freedom. The systematic explication 
of freedom as critique expands the usual concepts of freedom in social philosophy and serves as a 
normative foundation of pluralistic radical democracy in postfundationalism. 
In what follows, I first present the standard objection and the standard response. Second, I 
elaborate on the problem of subjectification and explore what would be needed to solve it: an 
account of freedom as critique. Third, I explain that the standard response only accounts for free-
dom to act differently, but not for freedom as critique. Freedom as critique demands a ‘modally 
robust’ explanation, which is absent in freedom to act differently. I conclude by sketching how the 
problem can be solved through the institutionalist reading, which accounts for modal robustness 
and therefore is able to explain freedom as critique, and how it enriches postfoundationlist demo-
cratic theory as well as the social-philosophical debates on freedom in general. 
 
1 Standard Objection and Response: ‘The Subject and Power’ as a Solution to the 
Problem of Power-Determination 
In the archaeological phase, the problem of freedom is centered on language and thinking.9 Fou-
cault shows that the possibilities of thinking are fundamentally limited due to their dependence on 
a historical a priori, the so-called episteme. All discourses in which thought is expressed are or-
dered and regulated by their internal rules in relation to the episteme. They are therefore not de-
pendent on thinking of individual subjects, or ahistorical reason, but are fundamentally contingent. 
This social theory entails a problem of freedom because it shows that traditional concepts of free-
dom are not consistent: Freedom can neither be defined as arbitrary will (as in liberalism), nor as 
reason (as in Kantianism), nor as historical progress and social integration (as in Hegelianism). 
5 
Foucault extends his social theory to the realms of materiality, social institutions, and bod-
ies in his genealogical phase.10 Discipline and Punish (1977) is both a genealogy of the modern 
prison as well as a critique of modern capitalism as based on the same social technologies which 
are used to discipline and subject individuals in the prison. By rejection of the methods of norma-
tive social philosophy which would enable to differentiate liberating and repressive aspects of 
modernity, and rejection of an account of socialization which would explain how individuals de-
velop own agency, Discipline and Punish presents a picture of modern society as total repression. 
That there is no outside of power is the central critical insight of Foucault’s intervention. However, 
the standard objection raised against Foucault is that he conceptualizes power as only repressive, 
and therefore leaves neither a place for freedom and related concepts like resistance and emanci-
pation, nor for the articulation of a clear normative position.11 I call this standard objection the 
problem of power-determination in order to distinguish it from the problem of subjectification 
which I introduce in the following section. A central advance of my argument will be to show that 
solving the problem of power-determination is not enough, and that the problem of subjectification 
needs to be solved. 
The standard response to the standard objection, i.e. the problem of power-determination, 
mobilizes Foucault’s later works in his ethical phase, especially in the conceptual text The Subject 
and Power (1983).12 The argument is that Foucault corrects his earlier conceptual mistakes and 
comes up with a refined theory of power and freedom.13 In The Subject and Power, Foucault de-
velops an action-theoretical model of power and defines power as “relationships between partners” 
and “an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another.”14 Foucault is as 
explicit as one can be regarding the problem of power-determination which seems to exclude free-
dom: The definition of power “includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only 
over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.”15 While most interpreters hold the standard 
response today, Thomas Lemke’s Foucault’s analysis of modern governmentality: A critique of 
political reason (2019) gives arguably the best and most exemplary version of this widespread 
interpretative thesis. Therefore, I refer to Lemke’s text to structure my detailed discussion of Fou-
cault’s text in the presentation of the standard response. 
Compared with former publications, a striking feature of The Subject and Power is the 
action-theoretical and actor-based concept of power. Turning away from his former Nietzschean 
conception, Foucault describes power as social-ontologically reducible to actions of individual 
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actors. He defines power as a relation between actors where one actor influences the field of action 
of another actor. This definition is similar to the understanding of analytic social-philosophy, for 
example as in Thomas Wartenberg’s model16. It is easy to see how the action-theoretical model 
solves the problem of power-determination because here Foucault explicitly defines power and 
freedom in a relation of correlation and not in a relation of opposition. The action-theoretical model 
is built of the following systematic steps. 
To start with, Foucault defines power as “relationships between partners” and “an ensem-
ble of actions which induce others and follow from one another.”17 Power “is a way in which 
certain actions modify others.”18 As action, power “is integrated into a disparate field of possibil-
ities brought to bear upon permanent structures.”19 Power is different from consent, as consent is 
not modifying other actions but is based on the ‘free’ decision of the other. This means that classic 
negative freedom as non-interference is the presupposition of consent according to Foucault.20 
While Foucault differentiates actual exercise of power from consent, he states that the field of 
possibilities in which the exercise occurs can be based on prior consent.21 In order to differentiate 
power from violence, Foucault further specifies the definition: Power does not act directly upon 
bodies, like violence, but “in effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of 
action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the fu-
ture.”22 How does one act on the action of others when force is excluded? By acting upon the 
action environment, in order to indirectly influence their action, because the action environment is 
both the enabling and restricting factor of the action. Foucault consequently says that power aims 
to “act upon the possibilities of action of other people […] to structure the possible field of action 
of others.”23 
This demarcation from violence already includes the central definitory step for the solution 
of the problem of power-determination. Unlike violence, relations of power contain two necessary 
elements – Foucault says that they “are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relation-
ship”24 and thereby assigns them to the concept of power analytically: “That ‘the other’ (the one 
over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a 
person who acts; and that [secondly, KS], faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up.”25 Thus, in power-relations, 
the person upon whom power is exercised actually has a whole set of possibilities, and therefore 
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is free. Power which is “a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions [of, KS] 
an acting subject or acting subjects”26 social-ontologically presupposes freedom, as a result. Fou-
cault is very clear: “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. 
By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in 
which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized.”27 
This fundamental freedom, which I also call analytic freedom, as it is analytically inferred 
from the concept of power, Foucault deduces resistance from: “For, if it is true that at the heart 
power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a 
certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom then there is no relationship of 
power without the means of escape or possible flight.”28 And: “The relationship between power 
and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated.”29 In the standard response, these 
changes in the theory of power are taken to solve the problem of power-determination, namely the 
uncertainty about how human beings could be free and resist power. Foucault now assumes that 
human beings can always resist in relations of power. According to Lemke, this proves the equi-
primordiality of power and freedom which was missing in Foucault’s earlier conception. He sums 
up the importance of The Subject and Power: 
The emphasis placed on freedom as an integral element of power relations holds 
two important analytical consequences. First, this conceptual shift makes it possible 
to overcome the negative definition of resistance that marked Foucault’s earlier 
works by lending substance to his thesis that power and resistance originate in tan-
dem. Second, it presupposes a distinction that does not not occur in previous stud-
ies, which now assumes great significance: the difference between power and dom-
ination.30 
The standard response emphasizes the importance of this distinction between power and domina-
tion to which Lemke is referring. As Foucault rejected such a distinction in his genealogical phase, 
its introduction is a significant shift. The distinction is important in the standard response, as it 
contains a normative position, and therefore is taken to be a solution to the standard objection that 
Foucault is normatively confused or contradictory.31 The unclear status of normativity in Fou-
cault’s critical method is a central part of the problem of power determination and has been raised 
by numerous critics.32 The distinction is introduced only briefly in The Subject and Power; Fou-
cault elaborates on it in more detail in a central interview during his ethical phase: The Ethics of 
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the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.33 
Foucault’s usage of the terms power and domination in his late works on the one hand 
denominates different physical states of relations and, on the other hand, brings a differentiation 
between a general and a special case forth. Power is the term which denominates the social-onto-
logical fact of power, always coming together with freedom, as described above. It is a general 
and fundamental fact of the social, which is why it can neither be disposed nor normatively valued 
or criticized as such. 
That is to say, power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted 
“above” society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could 
perhaps dream of. In any case, to live in society is to live in such a way that action 
upon other actions is possible – and in fact ongoing. A society without power rela-
tions can only be an abstraction.34 
Because of the analytic freedom, these “always present” power relations “can be modified, 
they are not fixed once and for all. […] These power relations are this mobile, reversible, and 
unstable.”35 To describe the agonistic character of power relations, Foucault calls them “strategic” 
and analyzes their connection to “means of combat” and “confrontation strategies.”36 In difference 
to former works, Foucault’s usage of the notion ‘strategy’ is now completely transformed into an 
action theoretical term, describing the means used by actors in power relations: “One may also 
speak of a strategy proper to power relations insofar as they constitute modes of action upon pos-
sible action, the action of others. One can therefore interpret the mechanisms brought into play in 
power relations in terms of strategies.”37 Power relations imply for Foucault, “at least in potentia, 
a strategy of struggle”, which he defines through “the objective […] to act upon an adversary in 
such a manner as to render the struggle impossible for him.”38 Foucault deduces this implication 
from the “permanent condition” of power relations, “an insubordination and a certain essential 
obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom.”39 However, if one opponent succeeds to win 
the battle, that is the end of power: “A relationship of confrontation reaches its term, its final mo-
ment (and the victory of one of the two adversaries) when stable mechanisms replace the free play 
of antagonistic reactions.”40 While consensus and violence are the complete other of power, the 
stabilization of power is its internal other, which “result[s] in the limits of power.”41 
In summary: Power is characterized first through its social-ontological generality and sec-
ond through its mobile, reversible and instable – or liquid – physical state. In difference to power, 
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domination is power’s internal limit or the internal other of power, precisely, a specific case of 
solidification of power relations: 
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes en-
counters what may be called situations or states of domination in which the power 
relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strat-
egies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group 
succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing 
any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is 
faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain 
that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely 
constrained and limited.42 
Domination, according to Foucault, means the particular case of blocked, frozen resp. solidified 
power which prevents reversion and movement. For that matter, domination is something one-
sided: It is the success of a certain group or individual. In The Subject and Power, Foucault spec-
ifies the spatiality and temporality of domination: “Domination is in fact a general structure of 
power whose ramifications and consequences can sometimes be found descending to the most 
incalcitrant fibers of society. But at the same time it is a strategic situation more or less taken for 
granted and consolidated by means of a long-term confrontation between adversaries.”43 In this 
citation, domination is a society-wide structure and not only a local solidification, and its stability 
is based on its historical development.44 Freedom and domination are opposites because domina-
tion limits the free dynamic of power.  
So far, there are two concepts: Power (namely free and resistant games of power relations) 
and domination (namely a situation of solidification, which limits freedom and resistance). This 
definition brings up the question of how power is transformed into domination  – the answer be-
ing: through government. Foucault defines government as what stands between and connects 
power and domination: 
And between the two, between games of power and states of domination, you have 
technologies of government – understood, of course, in a very broad sense that in-
cludes not only the way institutions are governed but also the way one governs 
one’s wife and children. The analysis of these techniques is necessary because it is 
very often through such techniques that states of domination are established and 
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maintained. There are three levels to my analysis of power: strategic relations, tech-
niques of government, and states of domination.45 
Hence, there are three concepts which cover a spectrum from generality to specificity and from 
dynamic to solidified: Power (or “strategic relations”), government, domination. As Foucault 
equates power with freedom, and as freedom is a normative term, the distinction between power 
and domination is also a normative distinction, and not only a social ontological one (liquid/solid). 
The distinction of power and domination, thus, is Foucault’s answer to the constant critique that 
he lacks a normative orientation. Domination is ‘bad’ because it limits freedom, while ‘free’ games 
of power are ‘good’: 
This is precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad 
in itself, that we have to break free of. I do not think that a society can exist without 
power relations, if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to di-
rect and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve 
them in the utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules 
of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of 
the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible.46 
In the standard response, the differentiation between power and domination as ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ 
power is central, as it opens up the possibility for political critique. Thomas Lemke writes: 
The theoretical distinction between power and domination holds political signifi-
cance. Only on the basis of this distinction is it possible to formulate a critique of 
conditions of domination – and strategies to overturn them – without invoking some 
idea of a realm ‘beyond power.’ In this way, Foucault retains the premise of ‘om-
nipresent power’ in social relations while providing a criterion for distinguishing 
‘freer’ and ‘less free’ forms to power.47 
The social philosophical attraction of Foucault’s thinking lies in his conception of the immanence 
of power. There is no realm outside of power as in liberal political philosophy, instead power is 
omnipresent, and freedom cannot be located beyond power. In Foucault’s former works, the con-
ception of immanence did not allow for a differentiation between power that is freer and power 
that is less free. The standard response is that the distinction between power, government, and 
domination offers this differentiation. It allows for a concept of immanence of power and a 
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normative differentiation between different situations of power: situations in which there is only 
power (and therefor freedom) in contrast to situations in which power is solidified to domination 
(and therefore freedom is limited). This entails: While it is not possible to conceptualize a world 
without power, it is possible to conceptualize a world without government and domination. Be-
cause reducing or even transgressing government and domination is the normative vantage point 
of the standard response, I call it anarchist.  
According to the standard response, Foucault’s new social theory solves the problem of 
freedom: Now that freedom is not contradictory to, but a necessary element of power, it is clear 
that human beings are not determined by power. Because of this fundamental freedom, resistance 
is not rendered impossible by the conception of power but is always possible. Humans are not 
mere objects of the intensification of power through discipline in modernity, but they can and do 
in fact resist. 
My hypothesis is that this standard response is flawed because, merely reacting to the 
standard objection, it solves the wrong problem. The problem of determination which it solves is 
not what the debate about freedom in Foucault’s works really is about. The debate is, in fact, about 
the problem of subjectification. By focusing on the problem of subjectification, it will become 
clear that the standard response operates with the notion of freedom to act differently, which lacks 
modal robustness. Only an institutionalist interpretation of freedom as critique can account for 
modal robustness and thereby respond adequately to the problem of subjectification. Modal ro-
bustness means stability over different possible worlds, for example that there is still freedom in 
the possible world of the raise of world of right-wing populism. This reading entails investigating 
the institutional requirements of freedom and thereby breaks with the anarchist conception of the 
standard response, which conceptualizes institutions, i.e. government and domination, in opposi-
tion to freedom. 
 
2 The Problem of Subjectification and Freedom as Critique 
While the problem of determination consists in an interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical works, 
especially Discipline and Punish as describing a totality of power which determines individuals, 
the problem of subjectification is present in later works, especially on governmentality. In his his-
tory of governmentality, Foucault differentiates his conception of power into three different types: 
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sovereignty, government, and discipline.48 Discipline is the power which subjectivates in a way 
that it subjects individuals – hence the problem of determination in a book which only describes 
this kind of power, Discipline and Punish. Government, on the other hand, is a subtler form of 
power which is actually based on freedom. In the last section I reconstructed Foucault’s later so-
cial-philosophical systematization of his concept of power as government, which derives from the 
material of his genealogical analyses of government. These analyses focus on pastoral power and 
early liberalism. In both, government is the conduct of the actions of others. Freedom is not only 
a presupposition of these forms of power but also produced by power itself for its strategic goals. 
Foucault and, following him, scholars in the field of governmentality studies show that 
neoliberal government makes freedom its main strategy.49 In order to be a productive neoliberal 
subject, the subject must be free. Only a free subject can be creative, self-responsible and innova-
tive. Therefore, neoliberal subjectification does not operate by subjugating subjects but by creating 
incentives to become free and even resistant. The resistance against inefficient structures is taken 
to be an important driving force for improvement in neoliberalism. This complicates all and leads 
to the problem of subjectification: Of course, power and freedom are not opposites, but the freedom 
in neoliberalism is actually a strategy of power itself. Even resistance to power can be a strategy 
of power. While there is no problem anymore to speak about freedom in the theory of power, it is 
not clear if this freedom is the freedom one could want. On the contrary, even the free self-consti-
tuting activity of the subject is dependent on subjectification through power; freedom is only ne-
oliberal freedom. The analysis of governmentality and the concept of power and freedom as equi-
primordial opens up the possibility of a totality of repressive neoliberal power (which is supported 
by neoliberal freedom). So now we have a concept of subjectification which is compatible with 
freedom, but we still have the justified suspicion that we are more thoroughly subjugated through 
power than we usually think. The problem of subjectification is that we do not know how free we 
really are. The analysis of neoliberal government shows that neoliberal freedom is not desirable 
and does not allow for resistance against neoliberal government which leads to the question what 
‘real’ freedom could be and how it can be conceptualized in the framework of subjectification. 
While this problem is very visible in the case of neoliberalism, I do not call it the problem 
of neoliberalism but the problem of subjectification because it arises from the concept of subjecti-
fication, the complex constitution of the subject through the interaction of self-constitution and 
constitution through power. Following the radical historicism which underlies the theory of power 
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and subjectification, also the technologies of the self, which the subject uses to constitute itself 
freely, are fundamentally dependent on the regime of subjectification of a given time and place, 
thus: power. This conception does not allow for a differentiation between freedom as a strategy of 
power and ‘real’ freedom that would allow for resistance against power. Therefore, the problem 
of subjectification is an intensification of the problem of determination. The problem of determi-
nation was an unrealistic depiction of society as not allowing for freedom at all; but the problem 
of subjectification is more severe: While freedom exists, it is constituted and subtly repressed by 
power. Thus, the problem of subjectification lies in the fact that it is unclear how to distinguish 
between ‘repressive’ and ‘real’ freedom.50 
How can the problem of subjectification be solved? That is, how can we deal with the 
reasonable suspicion that our actions, even when we believe to be acting based on free will, are 
inevitably dependent on power? The term freedom must be differentiated in order to answer this 
question. It is necessary to find a concept of freedom which can explain a subject’s activity inde-
pendent of power, without giving up the hypothesis of subjectification that subjectivity is funda-
mentally constituted by power.51 
Foucault himself developed such a concept of freedom in his reflections on the method of 
genealogy in his later works.52 I call it freedom as critique, or: freedom as the capability to criti-
cally reflect on one’s own subjectification. Foucault describes genealogical critique as both an 
ontology of the present and history of the present. He considers it to be part of a practice of free-
dom, as it aims to critically reflect on the topic of subjectification. It renders subtle repression 
visible and thereby opens the possibility to change one’s identity, ethics, and politics. 
More systematically, freedom as critique can be described as a reflection of higher order 
than the immediate reflection, which is initiated by subjectification. This higher-order reflection 
allows to transgress the immediate reflection. In other words, it is a specific technology of the self 
which aims at reflecting the potential influence of power on all self-technologies. While also free-
dom as critique is dependent on subjectification – absolute freedom or freedom as a fixed status 
thus is impossible – it is a movement which always aims at transgressing itself and thereby reaches 
as much independence and distance from subjectification as possible.53 Freedom as critique is 
internalized hermeneutics of suspicion which always critically rechecks everything, including it-
self. It never stops but adds critical operation on critical operation; it is an operation of nth order, 
and therefore a practice (and not a status or state) but nevertheless dependent on capabilities.54 
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Through this operation of critique, which is a practice of the self on the self, a subject can 
transform itself by emancipating itself from the subjectifications which constituted it in the first 
place. It can reach independence and autonomy vis-a-vis the outside which constituted it. Some-
thing new is created which cannot be reduced to power. Freedom is an emergent level of operation 
vis-a-vis the subjectifications which constitute the subject – it is inner-psychic emergence. How 
change happens is not predictable but it is predictable that this sort of inner-psychic emergence 
becomes more likely due to free subjectifications.55 The method of genealogical critique aims at 
creating freedom which does not mean that it cannot be created through other means of critical 
reflection. The central argument is that freedom as critique cannot be presupposed in the subject. 
It can only arise as result of former subjectifications. As a technology of the self, it has to be 
learned and trained. 
The standard response is not blind to the problem of subjectification and the concept of 
freedom as critique. On the contrary, all interpreters of Foucault acknowledge the complex rela-
tionship between power as government and freedom. They also put emphasis on Foucault’s critical 
method of genealogy and its connection to his concept of freedom. Against this background of the 
problem of subjectification, they pose “the problem of ‘resistant subjectivity’”,56 and analyze that 
the answer is related to freedom as critique. However, as the standard response fundamentally 
draws on The Subject and Power and freedom to act differently, it is incapable of making argu-
mentative steps which are necessary for answering these questions. 
 
3 Beyond the Standard Response: Modally Robust Freedom as Critique 
The standard response is that the problem of freedom is solved in Foucault‘s later works, especially 
in his concept of power as government in The Subject and Power. By making the distinction be-
tween two types of problems and concepts of freedom which I introduced above – the problem of 
power-determination in relation to freedom to act differently and the problem of subjectification 
in relation to freedom as critique – it is possible to see why the standard response fails: It only 
accounts for freedom to act differently, and not for freedom as critique, and therefore cannot solve 
the problem of subjectification. The crucial difference between the two concepts of freedom is 
their varying modal robustness: Freedom as critique demands modal robustness of critical capa-
bilities and therefore leads to the question how freedom can be institutionalized. That such an 
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institutionalized reading is in contradiction to the anarchist commitments, which can also be found 
in Foucault and which are valued by many of his readers, explains why it has not been pursued 
before. 
Foucault derives fundamental freedom in The Subject and Power from the concept of 
power: It only makes sense to speak about power if the individual over whom power is exercised 
is „as a person who acts“ and thus is free to react to the exercise of power so that „a whole field 
responses, reactions, results and possible interventions may open up.“57 I called this concept of 
freedom analytic freedom, as it derives social-ontological freedom solely from the concept of 
power. It accounts for the social-ontological fact that human beings can always act differently, and 
therefore are not determined by power, more precisely if „the determining factors [do not] saturate 
the whole there is no relationship of power.“58 Thus, power requires social-ontological freedom 
to act and only changes the field of possible actions, „it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes 
easier or more difficult.“59 
So far, this social-ontological and analytical action-theoretical description of power as nec-
essarily connected with freedom is formalistic and empty. It is analytic insofar as this rudimentary 
concept of freedom can be derived already from the concept of power – and as it does not add 
anything. The described basic freedom can be attributed even to the disciplined and subjected 
subjects of Discipline and Punish. This, however, does not already enable them to be politically 
resistant. In other words: The social-theoretical changes in The Subject and Power solve the prob-
lem of power-determination, as Foucault writes explicitly that power presupposes freedom. But an 
account of analytic freedom is not already an account of resistant freedom or freedom as critique60 
which is the concept that characterizes resistant subjectivities.  
It is not only a problem of Foucault’s readers to confuse the different concepts of freedom, 
Foucault does so himself. After the formalistic description of freedom, Foucault is surprisingly 
charging the concept of freedom with a specific content and connects it to resistance. Because, 
according to Foucault, the use of power is geared towards determining the boundaries of freedom, 
freedom must, in turn, be resistant to power: „Freedom must resist the exercise of power which 
finally aims at totally determining it.“61 From this, Foucault deduces the necessary connection 
between power and resistance – “The relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit 
cannot therefore be separated.”62 
Foucault already states this connection between power and resistance in History of 
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Sexuality 1 (1978), where he, however, derives it from the Nietzschean conception of power as 
war, and not from conceptual logic and action theory. Foucault seems to come back to this former 
conception explicitly in The Subject and Power, writing „Rather than speaking of an essential 
[‘antagonism’]63, it would be better to speak of an ‚agonism‘ – of a relationship which is at the 
same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes 
both sides than permanent provocation.“64 Here it is not clear whether Foucault’s talk about re-
sistance extends the former, analytical and social-ontological statement that power presupposes 
freedom to act differently. Foucault seems to hover between deriving resistance from blockade 
and antagonism (resistance as a concrete reaction to the attempt of complete domination) and de-
fining resistance as a permanent agonistic dynamic. By postulating an antagonism, resistance could 
be described as one side of it, however this would fundamentally extend the social-ontological 
conception because such an antagonism cannot be explained in the action-theoretical model. 
Therefore, it is more plausible that Foucault derives resistance from a dynamism of permanent 
agonism. This interpretation is compatible with the action-theoretical and analytical framework 
but adds a kind of dynamism to freedom and resistance. It is more fitting to Foucault’s concept of 
power as continuous struggle and seems to be implied in the citation above where Foucault states 
that it is about agonism, not antagonism. But in this reading, resistance would be as much a social-
ontological basic fact as power and freedom – and thereby equally formalistic, empty, and not 
further qualified. These thoughts on resistance do not add to anything to the formal and analytic 
conception of freedom to act differently that has already been established. 
But Foucault seems to want more by elaborating on the meaning of resistance. While it 
was sufficient in the action-theoretical concept of freedom to have a choice of action within a given 
field of possible actions, the introduction of resistance implies that these possible actions are used 
to resist the influence of power on the field of possible actions, rather than just following one of 
the possible actions in a field of action constituted by power. This interpretation – that resistance 
requires the change of the field of action – is plausible if one takes into account that Foucault’s 
normative notion of freedom as critique aims at transforming oneself which also necessitates the 
transformation of power. 
Now, if Foucault’s discussion of resistance is really such a fundamental extension of the 
concept of freedom, which goes beyond the formal social-ontological and analytic conception of 
freedom, this purely formal conception is not enough to give an account of resistant freedom. If 
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resistance is supposed to be more than just the freedom to act differently which is analytically 
presupposed by power, it is necessary to say more about the conditions of this kind of resistance. 
The problem is that Foucault social-ontologically generalizes resistance, as he generalizes analytic 
freedom which precludes the possibility to ask social-theoretically (and not genealogically) about 
the specific conditions (for example historic, social, or socialontologically abstractable conditions) 
of resistance. Foucault does not distinguish between two different modalities of resistance: its gen-
eral possibility and its probability or actuality.65 Through his action-theoretical social-ontology 
and the analytic concept of freedom he can show that there is the general possibility of resistance 
but not its actuality or probability. 
Statements about the probability of freedom can be considered more ‘modally robust’ than 
statements which state the general possibility of freedom. I call the ‘argument from modal robust-
ness’ the claim that a social-theoretical account of freedom should not end by stating the general 
possibility of freedom but should differentiate situations according to the probability of freedom. 
The argument is inspired by applications of modal logic in contemporary social philosophy, espe-
cially the so-called neo-republican tradition with its key figure Philipp Pettit.66 While the neo-
republican tradition offers a specific account of freedom as non-domination based on a wholly 
different social-ontology67 than the Foucauldian freedom as critique, I argue that the neo-republi-
can use of modal logic without neo-republican social ontology is particularly illuminating for the 
development of the Foucauldian concept of freedom as critique.  
Very roughly, a state is modally robust if it occurs in many different possible worlds, i.e. 
when it is probable. The language of possible worlds helps explain different aspects and conditions 
of robustness and probability.68 Neo-republican authors put forward the argument of modal ro-
bustness to criticize traditional conceptions of liberal freedom as non-interference. Within this 
conception, you are free under the rule of a benevolent dictator, given that they choose not to 
intervene in your life even though they could. In contrast, freedom as non-domination is modally 
robust: Its core meaning is not actual non-interference, but robust non-interference, i.e. the insti-
tutional stabilization of freedom as non-interference. To stabilize the absence of arbitrary interfer-
ence, the rule of law is key, according to neo-republicans, as only the rule of law can guarantee 
non-interference in relevant possible worlds, for example the possible world of a right-wing gov-
ernment. Accordingly, freedom of non-domination “has a built-in rule-of-law requirement.”69 
This argument from modal robustness applies to the discussion of freedom as critique, 
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albeit here on ‘inner’ and not external limitations of freedom. As in freedom as non-interference, 
accounting for resistance and the capability for critique through freedom to act differently is not 
modally robust, but contingent. Resistance is possible, but not probable. The concept cannot say 
anything about relevant possible worlds and how to ensure resistant subjectivity in such possible 
worlds. Just like freedom as non-interference does not guarantee that the benevolent dictator does 
not turn hostile, freedom to act differently does not guarantee the development of critical capabil-
ities. In contrast, freedom as critique is a modally robust concept, i.e. it necessitates the stabiliza-
tion of critical and potentially resistant subjectivity.70 This demand for robustness stems from the 
normativity of the concept: In the language of modality it is a modal desiderata which describes 
permissible worlds, according to which we should change modal facts that influence the set of 
possible worlds.71 That means we should influence the world in such a way that freedom as cri-
tique is ensured in the relevant possible worlds, i.e. that resistant subjectivity is stabilized.  
Equipped with this vocabulary, it is possible to understand the tensions I analyzed regard-
ing the status of resistance in The Subject and Power as stemming from a missing differentiation 
between the modalities of the concepts of freedom involved. From the discussion of the problem 
of subjectification and the concept of freedom as critique, it can be concluded that Foucault and 
his readers mean more by resistance than the mere freedom to act differently: a reflected, directed, 
and intentional resistance as critique with the aim of self-determination. But in this case, resistance 
is a demanding capability that cannot be generalized, but is only contingent, which is why a mo-
dally robust account of freedom as critique is necessary to explain how its general possibility can 
be transformed into probability and actuality. This allows us to overcome both the standard objec-
tion and the standard response by specifying freedom as critique’s modal robustness through the 
modal facts leading to the probability of critical subjectivity.  
These conceptual propositions significantly extend the possibilities of critical social theory 
following Foucault. In the framework of the standard objection and response, the relationship of 
practices of government and practices of freedom are not systematically investigated, as govern-
ment and domination are seen as limiting freedom per se; rather, in this framework, social critique 
is limited to the optimistic assumption that there will always be critique, often reducing critical 
research to happily highlighting existing and past resistances.72 Following freedom of critique, it 
is possible to conceptualize the social conditions of freedom and resistance, especially the institu-
tions which could follow from Foucault’s normative commitments. My conclusion briefly 
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elaborates on this institutional reading and how it critically expands the three common notions of 
freedom in social philosophy. 
 
Conclusion 
Foucault’s theory of power productively complicates the common social-philosophical concepts 
of freedom by the problem of subjectification, i.e. ‘inner’ unfreedom which follows from the social 
constitution of subjectivity. While the problem of subjectification challenges the three common 
concepts of freedom – negative, reflective, and social – the Foucauldian notion of freedom as 
critique is equipped to solve it. In contrast to the standard response of Foucault’s interpreters to 
the problem of freedom, I argued that it is crucial to account for the modal robustness of freedom 
as critique. 
Modal robustness can be achieved by changing the modal facts, i.e. the situation which 
makes possible worlds more or less likely. In Foucault’s terms, strict modal robustness is a situa-
tion of domination (when power is fixed), and relative modal robustness or probability is govern-
ment. Thus, in contrast to the standard response which sees freedom as the opposite of government, 
a modally robust notion of freedom as critique entails a normative differentiation of forms of gov-
ernment and their subjectifications. This is because freedom as critique is such a demanding capa-
bility that it cannot be presupposed within the subject but rather can only be the result of specific 
regimes of subjectification that I call free or critical subjectification. And modally robust regimes 
of critical subjectification are a specific form of government that could be termed ‘free’ or ‘critical’ 
government. This is precisely the opposite of neoliberal government which uses ‘freedom’ as a 
means for social control, as governmentality studies showed. To search for such kind of free or 
critical government means, in other words, to normatively differentiate between political institu-
tions according to their subjectification. This entails a rather un-foucauldian turn: To connect the 
theory of subjectification with political theory, understood as a normative thinking about institu-
tions, and to break with Foucault’s partly anarchist commitments. 
Following this path is promising, as it finally brings clarity to the debate about freedom in 
Foucault’s works. Furthermore, the institutional reading opens the new possibility to engage Fou-
cault with democratic theory and with the common concepts of freedom in social philosophy. Re-
garding democratic theory, the Foucauldian notion of freedom as critique can serve to explain how 
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the critique of institutions can be institutionalized, thus systematically presenting the democratic-
theoretical consequences and resources of Foucault’s thinking for the first time.73 Specifically, the 
concept can serve as a normative basis for postfoundational and radical concepts of democracy. 
Postfoundationalist democratic theory describes the political as intrinsically contingent and antag-
onistic, leading to powerful analysis of politics, but this anti-universalism is a challenge for devel-
oping a normative account of democratic institutions within this tradition.74 Freedom as critique, 
being an institutionalization of anti-universalist critiques of power, is “the last universalism” in 
postfoundational thinking and allows us to clarify the normative and institutional commitments of 
postfoundational political theory, as I argued elsewhere.75  
As a new conceptual candidate, freedom as critique enriches the general social-philosoph-
ical debate about the different concepts of freedom, encapsulating the political dimension of ‘in-
ner’ unfreedom and postfoundationalist skepticism in one conception of freedom for the first time. 
It offers the democratic-theoretical and social-philosophical desideratum of Foucault's analysis of 
power, which can be processed as immanent critique by existing accounts of freedom. 
In contrast to a negative conception of freedom, as it is represented by classical political 
liberalism like Hobbes, Berlin, and Rawls 76 as well as by neo-republicanism like Pettit and 
Lovett77, the perspective of freedom as critique emphasizes that internal or psychological unfree-
dom is a politically relevant problem. While there are many areas of politics in which it is appro-
priate to understand the politically relevant freedom as negative freedom, the perspective of free-
dom as critique can shed light on those areas in which negative freedom is not sufficient. These 
areas of imperceptible domination and normalization are, for example, sexist, racist, and capitalist 
subjectivations. With a negative conception of freedom, these internal types of unfreedom cannot 
be addressed, which is why an institutional design based on such a conception cannot deal with 
this unfreedom. This can be corrected by the perspective of freedom as critique, for example 
through an educational policy that thematizes this type of unfreedom and encourages reflection on 
it. 
In contrast to a positive or reflexive concept of freedom that equates freedom with reason 
as it occurs in the Kantian tradition, freedom as critique illuminates the normalizing and repressive 
effects of reason, insofar as it is always impure. While the difference between such a universal 
moral perspective and the skeptical anti-universalist perspective of freedom as critique seems to 
be philosophically fundamental, it can be accommodated by contextual accounts of universalism 
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and the concept of immanent critique.78 Once this step has been taken, the proceduralization of 
political discourse in deliberative models79 and the Foucauldian demand for constant reflexive 
critique of subjectification have great similarities. The concept of freedom as critique complements 
political theories based on reflection with the problematization of imperceptible normalization 
through subjectification, which does not appear sufficiently in these perspectives.  
Between a social conception of freedom as it is put forward in the Hegelian tradition, but 
also in traditional republicanism and communitarianism80 and freedom as critique, there is a fun-
damental agreement and a difference: The agreement consists in both social freedom and freedom 
as critique drawing on a holistic social ontology and conceptualizing subjects as socially consti-
tuted.81 The difference consists in the fact that the tradition of social freedom does not see this 
social-ontological insight as problem of freedom, but tends to equate successful social integration 
with freedom. In contrast, freedom as critique is fundamentally skeptical of social integration and 
suspects it of being, sometimes imperceptibly, repressive. Whether the two perspectives are com-
patible depends on the concrete interpretation of social freedom. Conflict is not fundamentally 
alien to the perspective of social freedom.82 If conflict and the potential paternalism of social free-
dom were brought into the center of the theories on social freedom, there would be no fundamental 
incompatibility.83 Integrating the problematization of subjectivation into the theories based on so-
cial freedom can correct their optimism about socialization and help describe the repressive nor-
malization they tend to overlook, in order to make them more realistic, as Katharine McIntyre 
recently argued in Philosophy and Social Criticism.84 
In this paper, I presented the first step for the development of this new Foucauldian concept 
of freedom as critique: To explain how the standard objection against Foucault and the standard 
response of Foucauldians are both committed to an anarchist reading of Foucault, which missed 
key differentiations of problems and notions of freedom in Foucault’s thought. An institutional 
account that integrates the argument for modal robustness helps to carefully distinguish the differ-
ent notions of freedom that are present in Foucault’s texts, albeit often implicitly, which is crucial 
for any attempt to understand his thinking about power and freedom. That freedom to act differ-
ently is not the same as freedom as critique, which demands modal robustness, and that The Subject 
and Power should not be taken as the end of the debate about freedom in Foucault’s works are 
central insights which need to be taken into account by the many Foucault commentators who 
follow the standard response. This clarification about the problems and conceptions of freedom 
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could serve as a new beginning for debates about Foucauldian freedom in postfundationalist de-
mocracy and social philosophy. 
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